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1. IntroductIon
Individuals should differ in their tolerance 
for risky financial investments. For one 
thing, people face different income streams. 
A freelance writer typically faces consider-
able variability in income, and long-term 
unpredictability. These should generally 
be compensated by less risky investment. 
But a tenured professor faces little variabil-
ity or unpredictability and can thus afford 
to take more risks elsewhere, other things 
being equal. For another thing, people have 
different tastes for expenditures. Some peo-
ple value the “finer things” that money can 
buy, while others are convinced that the best 
things in life are free.
Individual differences in the taste for 
luxury should thus affect the utility func-
tion for money, e.g., income in retirement. 
Such differences can provide a test of 
methods for assessing the utility function. 
Those with no particular interest in luxu-
ries should have a concave utility function: 
a reasonable amount of money is sufficient 
and much more will not improve life that 
much. Those with more interest in luxuries 
should have utility functions closer to linear. 
The former should be more risk averse in 
investing, other things being equal, in line 
with expected-utility theory.
I have argued that we should think of 
utility as something real in the sense in 
which time and longitude are real, i.e., a 
measure based on a conception that we 
superimpose on the world (Baron, 2008), 
yet the same thing regardless of how we 
measure it. Utility is not just the output of 
a black box, such as the answer that subjects 
give to questions about hypothetical mone-
tary gambles. Such answers could be wrong, 
just as sundials are wrong about time and 
bad chronometers lead to errors in assess-
ing longitude. Yet, investment advisors often 
use hypothetical gambles to provide advice 
about saving for retirement.
Measures of risk attitude based on 
gambles are influenced by many other 
factors aside from the utility of money 
(Schoemaker, 1993; Baron, 2008). For 
example, decisions about risks are affected 
by: general beliefs about risk taking as a 
character trait, such as a desire to avoid 
being foolhardy, or timid; personality 
traits such as impulsiveness, anxiety level, 
and sensation-seeking; social pressures 
connected with these beliefs; superstition; 
anticipation of emotional reactions to 
losses, such as regret, guilt feelings (if others 
are affected), and disappointment, which 
go beyond the financial consequences in 
terms of lost purchasing power; lack of 
understanding of comparative risks and 
benefits, or the risk/benefit trade-off; mis-
perceptions of probability, such as neglect 
or exaggeration of very low probabilities; 
and isolation of individual decisions, so 
that they are not seen in the context of a 
total portfolio of income streams from 
various sources. Moreover, hypothetical 
gambles provide results that are internally 
inconsistent (Baron, 1997). More direct 
measures of utility, such as those based on 
comparison of differences, may be more 
valid, and they are at least as justifiable on 
theoretical grounds (Krantz et al., 1971; 
Baron, 2008, Chapter 4).
I report a small study suggesting that dif-
ference-based measures are more sensitive 
than gamble-based measures to the taste for 
luxuries. My approach was to ask people to 
evaluate a sample of possible expenditures, 
which I then place, post hoc, along a con-
tinuum from necessities to luxuries.
2. Method
Subjects were 77 members of a panel who 
did studies on the World Wide Web for pay. 
(Four others were omitted because they did 
the study too quickly to have read carefully.) 
Ages ranged from 20 to 76 (median 44); 
36% were male.
The study began with 36 pages about 
expenditures after retirement (defined as no 
longer working or reaching age 65, which-
ever came last). Examples of the expendi-
tures were:
owning one inexpensive car (versus no 
car);
owning a second inexpensive car (ver-
sus one inexpensive car);
owning two top-of-the line cars (versus 
two inexpensive cars);
having an extra bedroom in your home, 
for visitors;
having an extra two bedrooms in 
your home, for visitors, as opposed 
to one;
flying to see relatives (including 
children) or friends once a year;
flying to see relatives (including 
children) or friends five times per year 
(as opposed to once);
hiring someone to clean your home 
once per week;
hiring someone to maintain a garden 
or lawn;
hiring a chauffeur or cook;
being able to hire a personal assistant or 
nurse if you need assistance for health 
reasons;
being able to buy appropriate presents 
for friends and relatives on holidays, 
birthdays, etc.;
donating $1,000 to charity each year (as 
opposed to less than $100);
donating $10,000 to charity each year 
(as opposed to $1,000).
The order was fixed but reversed for half the 
subjects. Order had no effect on any meas-
ures of interest and is ignored. (And likewise 
for the order of question types described 
later.) After each item, the subject answered 
the following:
How does this affect what is important 
to you about your life as a retiree or 
senior?
*	 I don’t care about this at all.
*	 This would be nice, but it would have 
little effect.
*	 This would have a noticeable effect.
*	 This would have a large effect.
*	 This is absolutely essential.
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The variance of the risk measure was 
lower than that of the difference measure 
(0.062 versus 0.118, p = 0.0060 for the dif-
ference, p
rep
 = 0.96). This result implies that 
people differ more in their utility functions 
than what we would assume from their risk 
preferences.
Several other studies attempted to repli-
cate this result. One did so successfully with 
students. But another, also with students, 
failed to find a significant effect when the 
utility measures (gamble and difference) 
came before the luxury measures. Although 
I made no direct comparison of studies, it is 
possible that the luxury measures are help-
ful in thinking about the utility of money 
in retirement, thus benefiting the difference 
measure but not the gamble measure, which 
may still focus people on the risk itself.
4. conclusIon
Asking people about risk preferences using 
hypothetical gambles may lead to choices 
that fail to maximize their expected util-
ity. In particular, some people may have 
substantial utility for luxuries, so that they 
ought to be willing to take risks in hopes of 
being able to afford those luxuries. Others 
have no use for luxuries and have no con-
flict with the single goal of trying to insure 
a no-frills retirement. These two extreme 
types do not seem to be differentiated by 
their risk attitude as assessed from hypo-
thetical gambles. But, if we ask them about 
their utility for money using a method of 
comparing differences, the results do reflect 
their different tastes. The use of direct ques-
tions about utility could lead to financial 
advice. For example, a risk lover with no 
interest in luxuries might be told, “Why take 
risks? What are you going to do if you make 
a lot of money? Do you care that much?” 
Of course, risk itself has consequences for 
utility in terms of anxiety, regret, and dis-
appointment over the long term, so these 
factors should be considered too.
More generally, the present results cast 
doubt on the use of hypothetical gambles 
to measure utility functions, and they sug-
gest that the use of a simplified measure 
based comparison of differences is feasible. 
Researchers often talk about “von Neuman/
Morgenstern utility” as if it were some spe-
cial sort of thing that is related specifically 
to gambles. Yet, our interest in utility stems 
from the idea that it is a measure of good-
ness, that is, the extent to which our goals 
the subject rated items as essential when 
they received such high ratings from oth-
ers, and as unnecessary when others gave 
them low ratings. A low slope indicated a 
tendency toward smaller differences in rat-
ings between “essential” and “inessential” 
items (as determined from other subjects’ 
ratings), hence to have higher than average 
relative utility for the luxury items, which 
were, presumably, those that most subjects 
rated as less than essential. A low slope 
should predict a less concave (more linear) 
utility function for money.
The other two measures were simply the 
mean responses to the difference items and 
the gamble items, where one indicates that 
the subject accepted the gamble or thought 
that the difference between the intermedi-
ate and high amounts was larger than the 
difference between the low and interme-
diate amounts. These means would be 0.7 
(between the third and fourth response 
option) for those who were risk neutral 
and had linear utility functions (assuming 
that these subjects would be indifferent 
when the intermediate value was equidis-
tant from the high and low values, so that 
they would respond randomly). Numbers 
lower than 0.7 indicated risk aversion or 
concave utility.
The means were 0.22 for the gambles and 
0.42 for the difference measures. Subjects 
were generally risk averse and had concave 
utility functions. The difference between 
gambles and difference measures was sig-
nificant, which indicates that risk aversion 
cannot be explained entirely in terms of the 
utility function as measured by difference 
judgments. Indeed, the two means were 
uncorrelated across subjects (r = 0.11, 
p = 0.34).
Of greatest interest were the corre-
lations of these two measures with the 
necessity-fever measure. As hypoth-
esized, the correlation between slope, the 
necessity-fever measure, and the differ-
ence measure was negative and signifi-
cant (r = −0.41, p = 0.0002). However, the 
correlation between necessity fever and 
the gamble measure was essentially zero 
(r = 0.05, slightly in the wrong direction). 
It is unlikely that this result is due to the 
unreliability of the gamble measure itself, 
as the 10 items had a reliability (α) of 0.88. 
Moreover, the two dependent correlations 
(0.05 and −0.41) were significantly different 
(p = 0.0008).
The last 20 items consisted of 10 items 
about direct utility measurement and 10 
about risk. Five of the utility items were of 
this form:
Which would have a greater effect on 
what is important to you about your 
life as a retiree or senior?
*	 The difference between a household 
annual (pre-tax) income of $40,000 and 
[$50,000, $60,000, $70,000, $80,000, 
$90,000], or
* The difference between [$50,000, 
$60,000, $70,000, $80,000, $90,000] 
and $120,000.
The figures in brackets were for the interme-
diate value, which increased from $50,000 
to $90,000 over the five pages (or decreased, 
for half the subjects). Then the sequence 
was repeated, again with $40,000 as the 
lowest income, but with all other differ-
ences from $40,000 multiplied by 3, so that 
the steps were in increments of $30,000 
instead of $10,000 and the top income was 
$280,000 instead of $120,000. (Order of 
the two sequences was reversed for half the 
subjects.)
The other 10 pages (which came first for 
half the subjects) were of the form:
Supposed you had a choice of two invest-
ments for retirement. Each would pro-
vide your sole income during your entire 
retirement at the given rate (the same 
for all years). Which would you choose?
*	 This one would pay [$50,000, $60,000, 
$70,000, $80,000, $90,000] per year 
(in current dollars) throughout your 
retirement.
* This one has a 50% chance of paying 
$40,000 per year and a 50% chance of 
paying $120,000.
The numbers used, and the orders, were the 
same as for the difference question. Because 
of this matching, I could directly compare 
the subject’s risk attitude to the prediction 
of expected-utility theory.
3. results and dIscussIon
I calculated three measures for each subject. 
One, which I call necessity fever, was the 
slope of the linear regression of the sub-
ject’s ratings (0–4) of the 36 expenditure 
items on the mean ratings of all the sub-
jects. A high positive slope indicated that 
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another way to look at them is to say that 
the term “preference” is somewhat ambigu-
ous between “what I choose now” and “what 
is best for me.” Responses to gambles may 
reflect the former but not the latter.
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are achieved. If responses to gambles do not 
measure utility in this sense, we have bet-
ter alternative measures. To define utility in 
terms of responses to gambles is like defin-
ing time in terms of the output of a sundial.
To be sure, it is possible that other meas-
ures using hypothetical decisions with 
probabilistic outcomes could do better 
than the gambles used here. For example, 
Kusev et al. (2009) and Jones and Oaksford 
(2011) found that utility functions differed 
depending on whether the choices were 
gambles, precautions, or transactions. It 
is also possible that the direct judgment 
method used here has other problems that 
would render it less useful in other contexts.
The present results might be taken as 
a sign that utility is unstable, and that, 
therefore, risk preferences are unstable. Yet 
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